Trump Should Create a Verification Regime to Ensure Chinese E-Commerce Platforms Comply With Protections Against Forced Labor
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is investigating the Chinese e-commerce platform Temu for violating the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), according to the New York Post. The UFLPA aims to block U.S. imports of goods produced using forced labor in Xinjiang, a region in China where the government is accused of unfairly treating its Uyghur minority.
Goods made with forced labor are not only unethical but also undercut fair competition by creating artificially low prices that distort markets. Unfortunately, current methods to ensure UFLPA compliance fall short. To address this issue, the incoming U.S. presidential administration should implement randomized audits of sellers and forensic testing of products to identify non-compliance and hold violators accountable.
The U.S. government has four options to ensure a platform’s UFLPA compliance: self-certification, third-party certification, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) certification, and CBP audits. While the first three methods are ineffective or unviable, CBP audits show promise.
The first option, self-certification—which Temu vendors currently use—is inadequate for ensuring UFLPA compliance because it puts too much trust in the companies responsible for adhering to the law. While Temu mandates vendor compliance with destination countries’ laws, a 2023 House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party report revealed that Temu “does not expressly prohibit third-party sellers from selling products based on their origin in [Xinjiang].” Additionally, the report noted that Temu admitted it lacks independent systems to enforce UFLPA compliance. Similarly, a 2021 UK House of Commons report found that “many companies asserted that they have robust procedures for prohibiting human rights abuses while failing to undertake the necessary and basic due diligence procedures to know for certain.”
However, some companies demonstrate greater transparency in their oversight. U.S. e-commerce platforms generally have a higher degree of supply chain transparency than their Chinese counterparts. For instance, Amazon’s annual supply chain reports include data on assessments of vendors on issues relating to “Freely Chosen Employment”. In contrast, PDD Holdings, the parent company of Temu, last released a sustainability report in 2020, which made no mention of forced labor.
The second option, third-party certification—where an independent party verifies UFLPA compliance—would provide greater visibility into Chinese e-commerce platforms but would likely fail to catch all UFLPA violations. While third-party certification is not currently required for Temu vendors under UFLPA, it is required for various product safety regulations. For this process, Chinese vendors often rely on Chinese third-party certification companies accredited by the U.S. government agency overseeing product safety.
One of the largest of these companies is Chinatesta Textile Testing & Certification Services (CTTC), which has deep ties to the Chinese government. CCTC was founded by the China Textile Academy, a subsidiary of a Chinese state-owned enterprise. Further upstream, textile inspection and testing in Xinjiang is restricted to government-run entities. Given the Chinese government’s denial of human rights abuses in Xinjiang, both state-owned enterprises and government-run entities are unlikely to provide trustworthy UFLPA certification.
A third option is a blanket inclusion of Chinese e-commerce platforms under the UFLPA. Under Section 2(d)(2)(B)(iv) of the UFLPA, DHS could designate a platform, presuming that all goods sold into the U.S. by that platform violate the UFLPA unless CBP determines otherwise with “clear and convincing evidence.” To date, DHS has not added any entities that serve solely as exporters to this sub-list. In its current form, the UFLPA’s mechanics address entire e-commerce platforms more broadly and bluntly than individual vendors.
If DHS adds a Chinese e-commerce platform to the UFLPA, the platform will have to report the entire supply chain for each vendor to the CBP to refute UFLPA violations. This would likely result in three outcomes: 1) CBP would become overwhelmed with hundreds of thousands of vendor supply chain certifications, 2) the platform would face significant compliance costs, and 3) China would retaliate against U.S. businesses in response.
A fourth, and most promising, option is for CBP to conduct randomized audits using forensic testing technology to verify UFLPA compliance for goods imported from Chinese e-commerce platforms. Techniques like isotope testing can reveal attributes that indicate whether materials originated in Xinjiang. CBP should deploy these methods through randomized audits or targeted investigations of platforms suspected of UFLPA violation.
CBP should publicly disclose audit results, while DHS should grant platforms found in violation a window of time to address these issues. If violations persist, platforms could face blanket inclusion under the UFLPA. Adopting forensic testing would not only strengthen enforcement but also drive innovation in supply chain verification technologies and systems.
Policymakers should aim for a balanced approach to UFLPA compliance regulation—ensuring that platforms transparent about their supply chains are not overburdened, while also preventing bad actors from exploiting the system. By implementing a verification regime using randomized audits and forensic testing technology, policymakers can strike the right balance.
